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ABSTRACT: 
Drawing on the ethnographic study of urological cancer services, this essay 
explores how a set of particular discourses, embedded in the everyday clinical 
work in a large teaching hospital in UK, helps materialise particular 
configurations of cancer, and the related professional identities. Emerging on the 
intersection of specific social-material arrangements (cancer survival rates, 
treatment regimens, cancer staging classifications, metaphors, clinical 
specialities), and operating across a number of differential relations 
(curable/incurable, treatable/untreatable, aggressive/nonaggressive), these 
configurations help constitute the categories of “good” and “bad” cancers as 
separate and contrasting entities. Involved in materialising particular 
2 
 
   
distributions of power, these categories are implicated in the making of specific 
claims about the identity of urological cancer services as unique and privileged. 
Exploring these issues in view of the feminist and material-semiotic approaches 
to studying science, technology and medicine, this essay seeks to move away 
from the understanding of cancer discourses as primarily linguistic 
performances, proposing to see them instead as arrangements of practices and 
relations, simultaneously material and semiotic, through which particular 
categories, entities and phenomena acquire their determinate nature. In doing 
so, it seeks to contribute to the sociology’s broader concern with discursive 
performativity of cancer. (192 words) 
KEYWORDS: 
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INTRODUCTION 
It’s trying to reassure them really. Because … the ones that I’m seeing are 
superficial and the word “cancer” it’s just like everybody panics about it. 
But superficial bladder cancer … the likelihood is it’s not going to affect their 
quality of life, it’s not going to affect their life expectancy probably and the 
treatment is very, very easy.  It’s just a case of surveillance, there’s no 
invasive treatment usually involved. So it’s more like reassuring them that 
actually this is good news… I’ve used the word “cancer” but it’s actually 
good news … 
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In the above quotation Julie, a urology nurse, speaks about her experiences of 
communicating a diagnosis of superficial bladder cancer.1 In a matter-of-factly 
manner she describes patients’ emotional difficulties of learning about their 
cancer and her role in reassuring them that in their case the prognosis is good 
and treatments easily tolerated. While the topic of these conversations – cancer 
– is clearly recognised as emotive, Julie’s account speaks to the everyday 
mundane reality of clinical work, underlining the routine and seemingly 
inconsequential nature of certain procedures, and certain conditions, and the 
equally routine character of emotion work undertaken by healthcare 
professionals, particularly nurses (James 1992; James 2004). It is precisely in 
this gap between the accepted emotiveness of cancer and the apparent 
ordinariness of related care that Julie performs her caring task of reassurance. It 
is achieved through a particular reading of a diagnosis of superficial bladder 
cancer which configures it as an instance of “good news”. The effects of this 
interpretation unfold in the way in which it is can be seen to profoundly disrupt 
the powerful, habitual configuration of cancer as a disease of severe significance. 
Julie’s account thus speaks directly to the discursivity of cancer: to different and 
sometimes conflicting configurations of this disease, to concrete practices and 
relations through which these configurations are constituted, and to their 
powerful effects. 
Social theory has long been concerned with the productive nature of discourses. 
Following from the work of Michel Foucault (1972; 1976), and its reworking in 
feminist theory and social studies of science, technology and medicine (Barad 
2003; Butler 1990; Castañeda 2002; Law 2002; Mol 2002) discourses have 
come to be seen as “boundary-making” practices (Barad 2003) which enable or 
constrain particular orderings of reality (Law 2009), and thus bring into being 
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particular versions of the world (Castañeda 2002). In this understanding,2 
discourses are not synonymous with rhetorical forms or linguistic performances, 
and consigned to the sphere of language. Rather, they are particular 
arrangements of conceptual and material relations and practices, where 
concepts are always already material as well as semiotic, and materialities bear 
various meanings. Matter and meaning are here perceived not only as 
inextricably entangled, but also as mutually constitutive. This has important 
consequences for the conceptualisation of discourses as performative. Their 
performativity is no longer thought of in terms of processes “by which human-
based linguistic practices (materially supported in some unspecified way) 
manage to produce substantive bodies/bodily substances” (Barad 2003: 824), 
but rather as realised in relations, simultaneously material and semiotic, through 
which particular categories, entities and phenomena acquire their determinate 
nature. As those relations always involve particular exclusions and distributions 
of power, discourses are never neutral or innocent, but have real consequences. 
In Barad’s words, “marks are left on bodies” (2003: 828). 
Reading through this lens of relational performativity, much of the literature 
exploring discursivity of cancer seems to focus predominantly on linguistic or 
semiotic practices – “cancer culture” – separating them from, or even 
contrasting with, its “biological form”, equated with physiological or biochemical 
processes (Jain 2007). This is particularly visible in the pre-occupation of many 
authors with metaphors and their role in the shaping of the cultural 
representation of cancer (Sontag 1979; Stacey 1997; Willig 2011). Certainly, 
various imageries – of a “war”, a “journey”, or a “gift” – have been employed to 
represent cancer and its embodied experience in medical practice (Reisfield and 
Wilson 2004), in the popular scientific discourse (Williams Camus 2009), and in 
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popular understandings of illness (Clarke 2004;Willig 2011). At the same time, 
the image of cancer has sometimes been mobilised as a metaphor for moral, 
psychological or social crises (Stacey 1997), or “a profound disequilibrium 
between individual and society” (Sontag 1979). Far from being neutral 
imageries, metaphors figure in these accounts as powerful technologies of 
signification, which – employed in medical and lay discourses – are productive of 
particular realities, highlighting certain alternatives and obscuring others (Lakoff 
and Johnson 1980; Williams Camus 2009). What tends to be overlooked in these 
interpretations is precisely the way in which these symbolic technologies are 
inextricably bound with various materialities. 
In this essay, we want to move away from such readings of metaphor as a 
purely rhetorical form, and of cancer as constituted through linguistic 
performances, and propose an alternative understanding of discursivity of cancer 
as configured through specific material and semiotic relations and practices. We 
will attempt to do this while considering a particular set of discourses embedded 
in the everyday clinical work of urological cancer services in a large UK teaching 
hospital. These discourses come into being in specific arrangements of concepts, 
practices and materialities which include, among others, cancer survival rates, 
clinical procedures, cancer staging, metaphors, and clinical specialities, and 
which – through their interactions – help constitute the categories of “good” and 
“bad” cancers as separate and contrasting entities. As we will illustrate, these 
categories are implicated in the making of specific claims about the identity of 
urological cancer services and the inter-speciality differences between urologists 
and oncologists treating patients with urological cancers. 
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BACKGROUND 
Urological cancers 
Urological services treat patients with a number of malignancies related to the 
urinary and male genital system. Those include cancers of bladder, kidney, 
prostate, testes and penis. For the purpose of service planning and the 
production of clinical guidelines, these various conditions are sometimes 
considered as one group (NICE 2002). Viewed in this way, they are relatively 
common, accounting for 19% of all new cases of cancer diagnosed in the UK 
every year (34% in men) and 13% of all cancer related deaths (21% in men) 
(Cancer Research UK 2012). However, as noted in the guidelines of National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence: “the patterns of care required for each 
cancer site vary widely because these cancers are very different in nature and 
characteristics” (NICE 2002: 8). The prevalence of different urological cancers 
varies from prostate cancer, the most commonly diagnosed cancer in men, 
affecting almost 41,000 people every year, to the very rare cancer of penis, 
presenting with just 500 cases every year (Cancer Research UK 2012). 
Urological cancers also differ in the populations that they affect with prostate, 
bladder and kidney cancers found mostly in older people, and testicular cancer 
affecting mostly young men. Finally, urological cancers vary in the treatments 
offered for different conditions with a range of treatments available for prostate 
cancer (e.g. active monitoring, conservative treatment of symptoms, radical 
surgery and radiotherapy, hormone therapy), and cancers of kidney, bladder, 
testes and penis treated predominantly with surgery or, in more advanced 
stages, with chemotherapy (NICE 2002). 
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Setting of the study 
City Royal Infirmary (CRI) is a large teaching hospital in the UK. Within CRI, as 
in other UK hospitals, services for people with urological cancers are spread over 
two clinical departments: urology and oncology, with weekly multi-disciplinary 
team (MDT) meetings helping to coordinate patient care across these 
departments. Within this system urology healthcare professionals are 
responsible for many initial diagnostic procedures (e.g. prostate biopsy or 
bladder endoscopy), the delivery of diagnosis and the treatment and follow up 
for all patients undergoing surgical intervention, and some patients with non-
surgical treatments (e.g. prostate cancer patients on active monitoring). 
Oncology healthcare professionals, on the other hand, are responsible for the 
treatment and follow up for all patients undergoing radiotherapy and most 
patients undergoing medical treatments. 
METHODS 
The discussion presented in this essay forms part of a study of communication 
practices and information provision in urological cancer services. This research 
sought to explore patients and healthcare professionals’ experiences of patient 
information for people with different urological cancers, and to develop 
recommendations for the design and provision of information for this group of 
patients. We undertook ethnographic fieldwork in the departments of urology 
and oncology in CRI. Within a 12 month period (from October 2010 to 
September 2011) 13 men diagnosed with prostate and bladder cancer were 
followed through their journey of care: from the referral to the department of 
urology for diagnostic procedures, through the delivery of diagnosis, pre-
8 
 
   
treatment and post-treatment appointments. Formal consultations and informal 
interactions with urology and oncology doctors and nurses were observed, and 
interviews were conducted with patients and with 22 professionals (consultants, 
registrars, nurses and nurse specialists). Fieldwork took place in day and in-
patient wards and out-patient clinics, and amounted to approximately 60 hours. 
Detailed field notes and interview transcripts formed the core of our dataset, and 
were supplemented by other materials, including patient information leaflets, 
clinical guidelines, and articles published in medical journals. In analysing these 
diverse data, we adopted a theoretical-methodological approach developed 
within feminist science studies (Castañeda 2002; Haraway 1997; Suchman 
2007), which focuses on the concept of figuration as a main analytical category. 
In this approach, figuration describes “the process by which a concept or entity 
is given particular form” (Castañeda 2002:3), or “figured”, through specific 
social-material practices that “bring together assemblages of stuff and meaning 
into more or less stable arrangements” (Suchman 2007: 227). Informed by this 
analytical framing, our data analysis was guided by a number of broad questions 
which focused specifically on the issue of different figurations of urological 
cancers. Particularly, we sought to explore how urological cancers were figured 
in discursive practices of different constituents (doctors, nurses, patients, 
medical scientists, clinical guideline panels); how these figurations were 
embedded in specific diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, and in different 
measurements associated with them; and how these figurations were also 
embedded in the specific ways in which urological cancer services were 
organised. 
The research received ethical and management approvals from the relevant NHS 
Research Ethics Committee and R&D office. All participants gave written consent 
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before participating in the research. Consent for the participation was also 
confirmed at the outset of every observation and interview. 
FINDINGS 
Good news, bad news 
We have started this essay with the words of Julie, a urology nurse, speaking of 
reassuring her patients in the face of a cancer diagnosis. As we have noted, her 
accomplishment of this task is dependent on a particular interpretation of a 
diagnosis of superficial bladder cancer which configures it as an instance of 
“good news”. This configuration is not a wilful invention of this particular nurse, 
neither is it a simple reflection of the “natural history” of this particular disease. 
Rather, it is an effect of a complex craftwork involving an array of social-material 
practices. Firstly, the configuration is proposed in the context of a concrete 
caring task of reassuring patients, and in reference to specific clinical 
procedures. As such, it is constituted in the particular clinical interactions and 
care activities, but also through broader material-conceptual arrangements, such 
as treatment protocols for superficial bladder cancer (Berg 1997), or standards 
of professional nursing practice (Latimer 2000). Secondly, Julie’s articulation of 
the “good news” of being diagnosed with superficial bladder cancer is made 
meaningful, and therefore reassuring, through its projected distinction from the 
instances of “bad news”. 
In the pragmatic terms rooted in the ethnomethodological tradition, “bad news” 
events can be defined as those events which disrupt the assumptions of what 
counts as the normal, predictable and moral order of everyday life (Maynard 
1996). More specifically, Julie’s reconfiguration intersects with what in the 
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medical literature is often referred to as the “breaking of bad news”, that is, 
disclosing information “likely to alter drastically a patient’s view of his or her 
future (whether at the time of diagnosis or when facing the failure of curative  
intention)” (Buckman 1984). The “breaking of bad news” is here figured as a 
particularly challenging instance of clinical interaction, both for patients and for 
healthcare professionals (Fallowfield and Jenkins 2004;Taylor 1988), and as 
such has been the subject of a number of clinical guidelines (Baile et al. 2000; 
Lees 2011). One of the challenges of the “breaking of bad news” is related to the 
tensions between an imperative of the full disclosure of cancer diagnosis and the 
practicalities of emotion work undertaken by healthcare professionals while 
dealing with the emotional reactions and needs of their patients (and their own 
emotions) (James 1992; James 2004). Julie’s account enacts these tensions, 
acknowledging the powerful effects of cancer as a classifying category (Bowker 
and Star 1999) and the need for mitigating its impact on newly diagnosed 
patients (Flanagan and Holmes 2000).  The configuration of a cancer diagnosis 
as conveying of “good news” is thus crafted in close relation – or intra-action 
(Barad 2003) – to the notion of the “breaking of bad news” and its tensions. 
Intersecting with an array of social-material arrangements and practices, at the 
same time local and specific, and more widely circulating, Julie’s account and the 
reconfiguration that it proposes attest to the material-semiotic performativity of 
cancer discourses through which particular categories – such as “good” and 
“bad” news, or “good” and “bad” cancer – acquire their determinate nature as 
one, not the other. In the following parts of this essay we will examine other 
concrete arrangements – of concepts, practices and materialities – which 
contribute to the discursivity of cancer, by constituting some cancers as curable, 
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easily treatable and relatively benign, and other cancers as fatal, associated with 
brutal and ineffective treatments, and aggressive. 
(In)curable cancers 
We start with an account from a urological surgeon, Mr Mitchell: 
I don’t think the younger guys, with testicular cancer, a lot of them don’t 
understand that the cure rate is really high, so that for most of them we 
are going to cure their disease. 
Mr Mitchell’s words resonate with those of the authors of the NICE guideline, 
which describe the effectiveness of treatments for testicular cancer in the 
following manner: 
… success rates are high – fewer than 10% of patients die from testicular 
cancer – but the problem may recur: up to 5% of men develop cancer in 
the remaining testis within 25 years of the initial diagnosis. (NICE 2002: 
17) 
These two passages speak of the chances of cure for people diagnosed with 
testicular cancer. A number of issues are being conflated in them: firstly, there 
are bodies to be treated and cured; secondly, there are procedures to affect the 
cure; finally, there are tools to measure it. The bodies to be treated and cured 
are those of men – younger men – with tumour in at least one of the testes. 
Most of these men will be cured, although some of them might die, and for some 
the cancer might reappear. The procedures to bring on the cure, not described 
but implied in these particular quotes, involve a surgical removal of the affected 
testis. This carries with it the usual attributes of a major surgery – 
hospitalisation, anaesthesia, wound – as well as the specific changes in bodies, 
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and in embodied gender identities (Chapple and McPherson 2004; Chapple and 
Ziebland 2004). Finally, the tools to measure the cure are those of statistical 
frequencies, cancer survival rates, which associate bodies – living or dead, free 
of cancer or not – and procedures performed on these bodies with population-
based calculations of probabilities (Hacking 1990). One in ten patients will die 
from testicular cancer; one in twenty will develop a new cancer. Bodies, 
procedures and measurements are thus mutually entangled in the notion of cure 
rate, and implicated in the configuring of two other notions: of the cure, and of a 
curable cancer. 
The Oxford English Dictionary presents the definition of cure as a “successful 
medical treatment; the action or process of healing a wound, a disease, or a sick 
person; restoration to health” (Definition II 6a). This definition associates the 
cure with restored health, the action of achieving it, and the method by which 
this is being accomplished. In simple terms, it relates the cure to a situation 
when a disease has been successfully treated and does not return. In cancer 
care the notion of cure is configured in more modest terms as a specific period 
of time over which the recurrence of cancer cannot be detected. This constitutes 
two important breaks from the OED definition. Firstly, it treats the restoration of 
health as conditional and time specific. Secondly, it predicates the 
presence/absence of a disease upon the method of its detection rather than the 
method of its eradication. Cancer survival rates are crucial in crafting this 
qualified notion of the cure,3 although – as evidenced by the above quotation 
from the NICE guideline – they do not do so in a simple or coherent way. With 
different statistical measures used to calculate a cancer prognosis – overall 
survival, cancer-specific survival, disease-free survival – the chance of curing a 
cancer might be constituted in relation to a number of people who were alive ten 
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years (or one, or two or five) after their diagnosis; or, who have not died from 
cancer within this particular period of time; or, who were alive and free from 
cancer, again in a given period of time since diagnosis.4 With all those 
contingencies, the measures are implicated in the configuring of some cancers 
as curable cancers.  
A recent publication in Health Statistics Quarterly (Woods et al. 2010) presents 
the following estimates of the relative 5-year survival for different urological 
malignancies: for prostate cancer 74%; for testicular cancer 97%; for bladder 
cancer 69% for men, and 57% for women; for kidney cancer 49% for men, and 
47% for women. From a brief glance some of these figures appear quite high: 
97% seem like very good odds, and so do 74%. It is perhaps more difficult to 
judge with 57% or 49% chance of survival, unless it is compared with even less 
favourable odds: 9% survival rate for oesophageal cancer, 7% for lung cancer, 
or 3% for pancreatic cancer. As the statistics which help constitute it, the 
configuration of what can be considered a curable cancer seems contingent too. 
Testicular cancer, and other urological malignancies, are constituted as curable 
in a differential relation to other cancers – classified as incurable – for which 
survival rates are much lower. In the words of Lorna, another urology nurse: 
I think it’s important for a patient to know the difference between a 
potentially curable cancer, to inform them that not all cancers, [that] 
cancer is not just one condition and the outcome is completely different 
from a cancer cell that creates lung cancer to a cancer cell that finishes up 
as a prostate cancer. 
As illustrated above the distinction between prostate and lung cancer is 
constituted through a material-semiotic arrangement of particular statistical 
14 
 
   
measures: cancer survival rates. But other social-material arrangements 
intersect in Lorna’s account too. These include among other the globally 
circulating popular configurations of lung cancer as an epitome of cancer, as a 
disease of severe consequence, while taking into account its high mortality 
rates, painful symptoms, and difficult to bear treatments.5 It is to this last issue 
– of cancer treatments – that we now turn in our attempt to further elucidate 
the discursivity of cancer and the distributions and exclusions that it brings forth. 
(Un)treatable cancers 
Let us return briefly to Julie’s words proposing a reconfiguration of a diagnosis of 
superficial bladder cancer as an instance of “good news”. One of the constituting 
elements of this reconfiguration was the categorisation of treatments for this 
particular disease as non-invasive and easily tolerated, as cases of “surveillance” 
rather than actual treatments. Or, in the words of Mr Duncan, another urological 
surgeon: 
 [superficial bladder cancer patients] will be coming back for regular [check 
up] and their follow up is ... usually a cystoscopy ... the treatment is 
relatively mild endoscopic treatment as and when they need it ... 
What are these mild, easy and non-invasive procedures, which seem hardly to 
qualify as treatments? According to an article published in a urology journal: 
Currently transurethral resection of bladder tumours (TURBT) represents 
the treatment of choice for low-grade, low-stage tumours. TURBT is not 
only a treatment for superficial bladder tumours but is also used for the 
diagnostic evaluation of most bladder tumours (all stages and grades) ... 
(Traxer et al. 2004) 
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As illustrated by this passage (and the accounts of Julie and Mr Duncan), in the 
case of some forms of bladder cancer a diagnostic evaluation, treatment and 
follow up care are all effected by the same procedure: transurethral resection of 
bladder tumour (TURBT). The procedure is usually undertaken with the use of an 
endoscope, in this case a resectoscope, fitted with different electrodes: a looped 
cutting electrode for dissecting the tumour, and a ball or bar coagulating 
electrode ensuring haemostasis. The resectoscope is inserted into a patient’s 
body through the urethra, thus eliminating the need for an external incision. As 
with many other surgical procedures, it requires anaesthesia, general or spinal, 
and is associated with a period of hospitalisation, usually no longer than 48 
hours. It is also associated with a risk of complications, such as bleeding, 
infection, and the damage to the bladder (Traxer et al. 2004). In many cases 
TURBT is followed by a course of chemotherapy administered directly to the 
bladder (NICE 2002). In many cases it is repeated to treat the recurring 
tumours, often on a regular basis for a prolonged period of time (Avritscher et 
al. 2006). 
As made obvious by this short description, the seemingly mild character of the 
treatment for superficial bladder tumours is constituted not only through the 
particularities of its procedure, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in a 
relation to other, more invasive, regimens routinely used to treat other types of 
cancer (including advanced stages of bladder cancer): open radical surgery, 
radiotherapy or chemotherapy. This is a relation both of contrast, and of 
gradation. As a series of endoscopic treatments is figured as less invasive than 
one major surgery, a radical surgical treatment is in turn figured as easier to 
tolerate than a course of radiotherapy or chemotherapy. To quote Andrew, as he 
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reflects on his two cancer treatments: a recent one, for localised prostate 
cancer, and an earlier one, for colorectal cancer: 
… it’s the second time in six years, I’ve been lucky on both occasions, I 
mean I’ve had two cancer operations, I’ve never had a bit of radiotherapy, 
chemotherapy, it’s just been a case of cut the cancer out but that’s because 
it’s been caught early, so I’ve been fortunate twice. 
And later on: 
But radiotherapy is something, having seen my mother go through it, so it’s 
not something I would have been looking forward to in any shape or form. 
Andrew considers himself as fortunate; he might have been diagnosed with 
cancer twice in the past six years, but on both occasions his cancer had been 
caught early: early enough to be treated with surgery, and also, implicitly, early 
enough to be considered curable. Andrew’s good fortune of having his cancer 
treated with surgery, and the related interpretation of surgery as a more 
effective and less gruelling treatment, is once again constituted in relation to 
particular arrangements, both local and specific, and global-general. Firstly, they 
are bound to a particular understanding of surgery as a treatment able to “cut 
the cancer out” and therefore to truly eradicate it. Secondly, they are grounded 
in Andrew’s memories of a radiological treatment received by his mother for 
breast cancer several years earlier, a treatment that was both difficult to tolerate 
and unsuccessful. Finally, they intersect with certain globally circulating notions 
of cancer treatments – particularly radiotherapy and chemotherapy – as brutal, 
counter-intuitive, often “worse than the disease” (Sontag 1979:64). In these 
global configurations the severe side effects of these treatments (nausea, hair 
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loss, scarring), and their sometimes uncertain results, are connected with some 
broader concerns, such as the threat of nuclear energy. 
Chemotherapy and radiotherapy evoke a further sense of dread. The 
vomiting, the hair loss, the burns. … Why submit yourself to radiation, 
which our collective memories associate with destruction – or even with 
more cancer? The stories of radiation in the postwar period involve the 
production of cancer, not its extinction. (Stacey 1997: 73) 
It is in relation to these and similar configurations that some urological 
malignancies, by the virtue of their seemingly mild, non-invasive treatments, are 
figured as easily treatable but also, at the same time, as relatively benign. In the 
next section we turn our attention to the issue of the apparent non-
aggressiveness of certain cancers, and to these social-material arrangements 
through which some cancers are configured as indolent and slow growing, and 
other cancers as high-risk or aggressive. 
(Non)aggressive cancers 
Let us return to Mr Mitchell, as he speaks about the specificity of prostate cancer 
as a potentially nonfatal disease: 
I don’t think people understand, for example, that prostate cancer, for a lot 
of them, it is a slow growing disease and they may not die of it, that they 
may die of something else...  
Mr Mitchell’s words intersect with the current medical understanding of what 
constitutes the “natural history” of prostate cancer, particularly at its early, 
localised stage: 
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In most patients, early stage PCa [prostate cancer] exhibits a relatively 
nonaggressive course during the first 15 years of diagnosis. (Crawford 
2009: 9) 
This widespread understanding figures prostate cancer as a largely 
nonaggressive, indolent disease which often remains asymptomatic over an 
extended period of years (Crawford 2009;Johansson et al. 2004). It also figures 
prostate cancer as a disease of older men, with over 75% of new cases 
diagnosed in men over the age of 65, and the highest incidence noted in men 
between the age of 75 and 79.6 In these older men prostate cancer may well be 
a disease one dies with rather than of. This expectation that the cancer will 
remain indolent and nonfatal is premised largely on the assessment of a 
patient’s life expectancy. 
…our data indicate that the probability of progression to a more aggressive 
and lethal phenotype may increase after long-term follow-up [over 15 years 
post diagnosis] of prostate cancers that are diagnosed at an early stage 
and initially left without treatment. These findings argue for early radical 
treatment of patients with long life expectancy. (Johansson et al. 2004: 
2718) 
For patients with life expectancy estimated as higher than 15 years, that is, for 
younger and healthier men, prostate cancer may not remain benign and slow 
growing, but, instead, it may turn into an aggressive and potentially fatal 
condition. The configuration of prostate cancer as a relatively nonaggressive 
disease is thus achieved through the differentiation between, on the one hand, 
its apparent indolence in older men and, on the other, its much greater threat to 
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younger men. The notion of cancer risk groups and the related concepts of the 
staging of disease are also implicated in this process. 
The NICE guideline presents the following stratification of risk groups in localised 
prostate cancer:  
Several factors have been shown to predict the risk of recurrence after 
treatment of localised prostate cancer. These include the Gleason score, the 
serum PSA level, and the T-stage. These predictive factors have been used 
to classify localised prostate cancer into risk groups, specifically: 
• Low-risk - PSA < 10 ng/ml and Gleason score ≤ 6, and clinical stage T1-
T2a 
• Intermediate-risk - PSA 10–20 ng/ml, or Gleason score 7, or clinical 
stage T2b or T2c 
• High-risk - PSA > 20 ng/ml, or Gleason score 8-10, or clinical stage T3-
T4 (NICE 2008: 23)  
Several things are being coordinated to configure the different risk categories for 
cancer. Firstly, there are the results of biochemical tests measuring the level of 
prostate specific antigen (PSA) in the blood. Secondly, there are the results of 
histologic analyses assessing the level of cell differentiation on the Gleason scale 
(which constitute the pathologic staging of cancer). Finally, there are the results 
of clinical examination establishing the size and possible spread of cancer 
beyond the prostate gland (which constitute the clinical staging of cancer). 
These different results are configured through different practices in the clinic 
(taking blood or tissue samples, performing a digital rectal examination), and in 
the laboratory (performing biochemical or microscopic analysis), and in relation 
to different objects or apparatuses (an ultrasound probe and a biopsy needle, a 
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doctor’s finger, a microscope, an immunometric assay kit). And they are 
instrumental in the crafting of different concepts of cancer: as presence of 
particular serum biomarkers detected through biochemical tests; as particular 
patterns of cell differentiation visible under the microscope; as presence of a 
mass noticeable to the touch.7 The different arrangements of clinical and 
scientific practices and apparatuses, and the different concepts of disease they 
help constitute, become coordinated in the stratification of cancer patients into 
low-, intermediate-, and high-risk categories. 
The staging of cancer and the allocation of patients into different risk categories 
are thus mutually entangled and implicated in the configuring of some cancers 
as low-risk and therefore relatively benign and other cancers as high-risk or 
aggressive, or – to use a metaphor popular among urologists and prostate 
cancer patients8 – as “pussycats” or “tigers”. 
Mr Swift [urological surgeon] explains again [that] surgery and 
radiotherapy options are meant to cure the cancer if they believe that it is 
aggressive. But not all cancers are aggressive, some of them just linger. 
The first option – to watch it – would help to determine what type of cancer 
it is. Frank [who had just been given the diagnosis of prostate cancer] 
exclaims that Mr Swift is the expert and asks him what to do. Mr Swift 
replies that they can watch it for a while and make PSA tests. If there is 
any sign of PSA going up they can go for an active treatment. But at least it 
will let them know if it is a tiger or a pussycat. 
In this metaphor, low- and high-risk categories of prostate cancer are figured 
respectively as a harmless pet and as a dangerous beast, but also as two of a 
kind, two contrasting specimens of the same animal: one tame and easily 
21 
 
   
managed, the other wild and uncontrollable. The framing of the metaphor within 
the consultation between Mr Swift and Frank indicates, however, that the nature 
of the beast, the aggressiveness of cancer, is far from certain, but is in the 
process of being determined in relation to particular tests, procedures and 
protocols. The differentiation between the apparent majority of indolent and 
nonaggressive cancers and the seemingly less common cases of high-risk and 
aggressive cancers seems therefore contingent: in the uncertainty of its 
prognostic potential, and in its reliance on particular social-material 
arrangements which link metaphors, prognostic models and treatment regimens 
with the broader “natural history” of prostate cancer. In the final part of this 
essay we turn our attention to the consequences of this and other earlier 
discussed configurations of cancer, to the particular distributions and exclusions 
they help materialise, and to the specific claims about the professional and 
institutional identity of urological cancer services they make possible. 
Privileged identity of urological cancer services 
Cancer survival rates, treatment regimens, staging classifications and metaphors 
are just a few of the many material-conceptual arrangements contributing to the 
different configurations of urological cancers. These configurations operate and 
are materialised across a set of differential relationships: between cancers that 
are curable or those that are deemed incurable, between cancers that are easily 
treatable and those associated with difficult treatments of uncertain success, 
between cancers that are relatively benign or those that are considered 
aggressive. In the everyday work of urological cancer services in CRI these 
different configurations are mobilised in making certain claims about the distinct 
identity of these services as treating predominantly the more curable, treatable 
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or benign cases of cancer, in other words, “good” cancers. To quote Peter, a 
urology nurse: 
…a lot of patients when they hear the word “cancer” probably think they’re 
going to be dead within either a few months or a year or two, and a lot of 
the cancers that we deal with in this department that is not the case.  
Unfortunately it is for some but [for] a lot that’s not the case… 
In this account, no longer referencing particular types of cancer (prostate, 
testes, or bladder) but rather an unspecified group of cancers dealt with in the 
department of urology, urological cancers are figured as one category, 
seemingly distinctive from any other malignancies. In this interpretive move the 
conditions which often differ in their aetiology and treatments, and in the way 
they affect people’s embodied experience, are rendered singular, their 
multiplicity effaced (Law 2002; Mol 2002). This reconfiguration is made even 
more evident in Lorna’s account, which makes an explicit use of an overarching 
category of “urological cancers” and mobilises it to emphasise a “privileged 
position” of urological cancer services:  
…part of our job is the reassurance that they’re not going to die. Now we 
obviously can’t a hundred percent give them that and we’re in a very 
privileged position in urological cancers because eighty percent of our cases 
are probably curative intent so I think to me that’s a reassurance. 
Certainly, Lorna and Peter’s configuration of urological cancers, and urological 
cancer services, intersects with the everyday practicalities of clinical work in the 
department of urology, where the early, curable stages of prostate cancer and 
bladder cancer form a major part of the cancer-related clinical workload. 
Localised prostate cancer and superficial bladder cancer may well account for 
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many of the “eighty percent of cases with curative intent” that urology 
professionals encounter in their daily work. However, by figuring urological 
cancers as largely “good” cancers, and urological cancer services as “privileged” 
and unique in treating them, this configuration helps effect a particular 
exclusion. In this process, the cases of “bad” cancer (those deemed as 
aggressive, or incurable, or associated with difficult treatments) are 
marginalised, their presence – as an antithesis to “good” cancers – both 
materialised and rendered invisible. In clinical practice there are no certainties, 
no “hundred percent” guarantees, and in some cases the diagnosis of a 
urological cancer is still linked to a limited life expectancy, and to unpleasant, 
invasive treatments. But, in the discourses which configure urological cancers as 
curable, easily treatable and benign, and their diagnosis as an instance of “good 
news”, patients with rare, incurable and difficult to manage illness seem to be 
granted little space. The distinctive identity of urological cancer services is thus 
constituted through the omission or silencing of those cancers which do not fit 
with the image of “good” cancer. It is also configured through the specific 
organisation of those services on the intersection between different clinical 
departments and specialities, particularly urology and oncology. 
All patients with urological cancer – both new and existing – should be 
managed by appropriate MDTs [multi-disciplinary teams]. Documented 
clinical policies for referral and treatment should be agreed between cancer 
leads in primary care and lead clinicians representing urological, oncology 
and palliative care services. (NICE 2002: 25) 
As illustrated by the above passage, the care for patients with urological cancers 
is coordinated across different clinical teams, and this process requires specific 
policies, written down (documented) and agreed on by their representatives. In 
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this emphasis on the procedures of coordination, the authors of the guideline 
seem to be highlighting the inter-speciality differences between urologists and 
oncologists, and between primary care and palliative care professionals. These 
differences are constituted, among other things, through the commitment of 
different specialists to particular treatment regimens.9 In the words of Mr Swift: 
…being a surgeon it may be that my bias may be towards surgery, 
allocating surgery as opposed to radiotherapy, for example; as opposed to 
the same patient going to an oncologist, a radiation oncologist, their bias 
might well be towards radiotherapy… 
The clinical collaboration and coordination across different departments and 
specialities, epitomised in the weekly MDT meetings, is thus enacted in close 
relation to intra-professional boundaries (Martin et al. 2009; Powell and Davies 
2012; Serra 2010). The configuration of urological cancers as largely “good” 
cancers is implicated in this process. To quote Dr Adams, a radiation oncologist: 
… with urological cancers there are far fewer problems that there are with 
some of the other malignancies that I deal with. Patients … tend to be 
relatively informed … and also to have expectations that tend to be very 
realistic. … [I]f you contrast it with the other major workload that I have 
which is with lung cancer patients: most lung cancer patients will only have 
known their diagnosis for sometimes a few hours or maybe a few days 
before they meet with an oncologist and many times the news that they’re 
going to get is not good news. … [This] makes it [treating patients with 
prostate cancer] in many ways a more rewarding, pleasurable area than 
some of the more difficult bits of oncology that I do. 
25 
 
   
In this account cancer is once again configured across a number of differential 
relations.  In intra-action with lung cancer as an ultimate instance of “bad 
news”, urological cancers – in the singularity of their unified category and in the 
particularity of the prostate cancer exemplar – are figured as treatable and 
nonfatal. Those affected by these cancers are, in turn, characterised as resilient 
patients whose emotions and expectations can be successfully managed, thus 
leading to a more “rewarding” clinical interaction.10 Figuring the care of 
urological cancer patients as less challenging than other “more difficult bits of 
oncology”, the remarks of Dr Adams help materialise another type of exclusion, 
this time in relation to intra-professional differences. As oncology emerges as a 
clinical discipline dealing primarily with problematic and unpleasant cases, with 
“bad” cancers, urological cancer services are cast again as distinct from other 
cancer services. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay we have explored the way in which a set of particular discourses, 
embedded in the everyday clinical work of urological cancer services in a large 
teaching hospital in UK, helps materialise particular configurations of cancer, and 
the related professional and institutional identities. Emerging on the intersection 
of specific social-material arrangements (cancer survival rates, treatment 
regimens, cancer staging classifications, metaphors, clinical specialities), and 
operating across a number of differential relations (curable/incurable, 
treatable/untreatable, aggressive/nonaggressive), these configurations help 
constitute the categories of “good” and “bad” cancers as separate and 
contrasting entities. Involved in materialising particular distributions of power 
(between the majority of “good” urological cancer and the minority of “bad” 
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cases; between urological cancer services and the “more difficult bits of 
oncology”), these categories are implicated in the making of specific claims 
about the identity of urological cancer services as unique and privileged in 
treating predominantly the cases of curable, easily treatable and relatively 
benign cancers. 
These specific configurations of cancer emerge from and are materially and 
semiotically constituted through a specific and located set of practices and 
arrangements (such as concrete clinical interactions or distinctive organisations 
of services). As such they can be considered “local” and “particular”. However, 
as we have demonstrated, these specific configurations are also inextricably 
entangled with broader, widely circulating arrangements (such as clinical 
protocols or statistical measures), and can therefore – to a certain extent – also 
be considered “global”.11 
Exploring these global-local configurations of cancer, and the concrete practices 
and apparatuses through which they are constituted, this essay contributes to 
the broader sociological debate concerning the discursive performativity of 
cancer. Drawing on the feminist and material-semiotic approaches to studying 
science, technology and medicine, it seeks to move away from the 
understanding of cancer discourses as primarily linguistic performances 
seemingly separated from the “biological” forms of the disease. Instead, it 
proposes more relational readings of the discursivity of cancer which – in Barad’s 
words (2003) – interpret “discursive practices … not [as] human-based activities 
but rather specific material (re)configurings of the world through which local 
determinations of boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially 
enacted” (828). As we have demonstrated, the categories of “good” and “bad” 
cancers, and distinct professional and institutional identities they help to 
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materialise, are not wilful inventions of urology doctors and nurses working in 
CRI, neither are they simple reflections of the “biological form”, or “natural 
history” of different urological cancers. Instead, they emerge from and are 
constituted through an array of social-material arrangements and practices 
which involve both human and non-human participants. 
NOTES 
(1) We have replaced the names of all persons and places with 
pseudonyms. 
(2) The reading of the concept of “discourse” that we propose here draws 
on writings of different authors subscribing to the broad tradition of 
material semiotics (Barad 2003, Bowker and Star 1999, Castañeda 
2002, Latour and Woolgar 1979, Law 2002, Mol 2002, Suchman 2007). 
(3) As we will illustrate below, diagnostic tools are also essential in this 
process. See also: Bell (2013), Bell and Kazanjian (2011). 
(4) In addition, as noted by Jain (2007), these population-based 
prognostic measures are highly problematic when looked at from the 
perspective of individual patients: “…the statistical prognosis poses 
both a stunningly specific (one has x percent chance of being alive in 
five years) and bloodlessly vague (you, yourself, will either be dead or 
alive) fact about the future” (78). 
(5) Chapple et al. (2004) discuss this configuration of lung cancer drawing 
particular attention to the stigma of this disease as a “self-inflicted 
injury” constituted through its association with smoking. 
(6) http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/cancer-
info/cancerstats/types/prostate/incidence/#age 
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(7) Bowker and Star (1999) make similar observation in the context of 
different classifications of cancer in ICD. 
(8) For other examples of the use of these metaphors see: Evans et al. 
(2007). 
(9) For instance, Broom (2005) speaks about the competition and conflict 
between urologists and oncologists in the context of prostate cancer 
treatments. 
(10) Willing (2011) talks about the figure of “resilient patient” as linked to 
another globally circulating configuration of cancer, the one she 
describes as “the imperative to ‘think positively’”. 
(11) Where – as indicated by Castañeda (2002) – global is always already 
located and particular. 
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